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STATE TAXATION OF FOREIGN FLAG AIR CARRIERS
Barry Bergert
Professor Berger asks whether a state can properly levy a
property tax on a foreign flag air carrier engaged solely in
foreign commerce. He finds no definitive answer to this
question on a national level and suggests that the Supreme
Court or Congress supply one.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1961, the Supreme Court of California, implicitly reversing a
stand taken three years earlier,' held in Scandinavian Airlines System,
Inc. v. County of Los Angeles2 that local taxing authorities could not
levy an apportioned ad valorem personal property tax on foreign owned
and based aircraft engaged in foreign commerce. The court relied on the
"home-port" doctrine which precludes the levy of a property tax on
ocean-going vessels by a jurisdiction other than that of its domicile.3
The decision by the United States Supreme Court denying certiorari in
Scandinavian let the California decision stand; as a consequence, it left
unanswered for the remaining states an important question: Can a state
properly levy a property tax on a foreign flag air carrier engaged solely
in foreign commerce?
The United States Supreme Court decisions involving state taxation
of aircraft, notably Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota,' and Braniff
Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Board of Equalization and Assess-
ment,6 dealt with American owned and based aircraft engaged in
interstate commerce7 rather than foreign owned and based aircraft
t Barry S. Berger, J.D., University of Houston; LL.M., Georgetown University; Asso-
ciate Professor of Law, University of Baltimore Law School; On leave, 1972-73; Assistant
Counsel, Select Committee on Crime, U.S. House of Representatives.
1. Where a nondomiciliary state has acquired the power to impose an apportioned tax, the
domicile must also impose an apportioned tax, even though there is no showing that the
aircraft has actually been taxed elsewhere. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., v. Couiuty of Los
Angeles, 51 Cal. 2d 314, 316, 333 P.2d 323, 325 (1958).
2. 56 Cal. 2d 11, 363 P.2d 25, 14 Cal. Rptr. 25 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 899 (1961).
3. For a good discussion of the "home-port" doctrine see Comment, State Taxation of Inter-
national Air Carriers, 57 Nw. U. L. REV. 92 (1962).
4. This question has been answered in the affirmative by the United States Supreme Court
as far as domestic carriers in interstate commerce is concerned. Braniff Airways, Inc. v.
Nebraska State Bd., 347 U.S. 590 (1954).
Also left unanswered was the question which the California court had settled in
Flying Tiger but then unsettled in Scandinavian: Can a state properly levy a property tax
on a domestically owned air carrier engaged solely in foreign commerce?
5. 322 U.S. 292 (1944).
6. 347 U.S. 590 (1954).
7. In Northwest the Court, while not making clear upon what "settled legal principles" its
decision was based, sustained an unapportioned tax levied by the domiciliary state.
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engaged in foreign commerce. Although the rules announced in these
cases are helpful in forecasting the position of the Supreme Court, the
cases themselves have a less than overpowering value as precedent for
deciding the instant issue8 inasmuch as they evolved from a line of
cases which did not deal with aircraft specifically, but with interstate
transportation generally.'
Because of the peculiar nature of air travel, state taxation of aircraft
raises not only constitutional questions' ° but also important inter-
national questions. Such taxation could impose trade barriers neither
contemplated nor controlled by the Federal Government. The multiple
taxation implications of such a state tax could cause international
repercussions and affect the United States foreign trade policy.' ' From
Justice Frankfurter, writing the conclusion and judgment of the Court, expressed a
belief that since the taxpayer could not show that any of the aircraft was out of the domi-
ciliary state for this whole year, they had not acquired a taxable situs elsewhere and thus
could be taxed of their full value. Justice Black, concurring, favored congressional resolu-
tion of this problem. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1944)
and Justice Jackson, concurring, favored the "home-port" rule. Id. at 308-26. For a good
discussion of Northwest see generally, Powell, Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota,
57 HARV. L. REV. 1097 (1944).
The Court in Braniff distinguished Northwest as a burden of proof problem stating
that if the taxpayer had established that the aircraft had acquired a permanent situs
elsewhere, the tax would not have been sustained. Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska
State Bd., 347 U.S. 590, 602 (1954). This distinction is perhaps borne out by the Court's
decision in Central R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607 (1961), which based its decision
affecting railroad rolling stock on the same distinction while upholding an unapportioned
tax levied by the domicile state. However, in Braniff an apportioned tax was levied by a
non-domicile state so the cases, though not inappropriate, are not entirely parallel.
Thus, in essence, the Court in Braniff reversed itself. The Northwest dissenters, who
favored application of the apportionment doctrine to aircraft, were in the majority in
Braniff.
Though the Court in Braniff quoted from Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Northwest
indicating that he recognized the apportionment principle, Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Minnesota, supra at 602, Frankfurter in Braniff indicated that he believed it should not
be applied to air transportation. Supra at 604. See Comment, State Taxation of Inter-
national Air Transportation, 11 STAN. L. REV. 518, 525 n.27 (1959).
8. Even though there has been no litigation since Scandinavian, the problem is certain to
surface because of the states' ever increasing need to find new sources of revenue. At
least 30 states make some assessment of commercial aircraft for property taxes.
Welch, Allocation of Airline Flight Equipment, a brief presented before California As-
sembly Committee on Revenue and Taxation, Sept. 6, 1967, accompanying cover letter
of Dec. 20, 1967, from Air Transport Association and its Public Affairs Committee
Memorandum No. 67-28 of Oct. 3, 1967 [hereinafter cited as ATA Brief]. In 1945 there
were at least eleven such states. Welch, The Taxation of Air Carriers, 11 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 584, 586 n.7 (1946).
9. See Comment, supra note 3; Ambler, Personal Property Taxes of Vessels Regularly En-
gaged in Interstate or Foreign Commerce, 20 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1 (1945); and Howard,
State Taxation of Airplanes in Interstate Commerce, 10 Mo. L. REV. 195 (1945).
10. Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd., 347 U.S. 590, 609 (1954) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
11. See Comment, supra note 7 at 519 nn.4, 10, 11, 520 n.12 (1959) in which responses from
foreign flag air carriers voice concern and possible reciprocity by levying a property tax
on foreign aircraft based on a mutual equity principle.
Of the eight countries responding to inquiries sent out by the Stanford Law Review
in 1959 only three countries, Japan, Germany and India, had a tax comparable to a prop-
erty tax on even domestic airlines. Id. at 519 n.11.
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the state's viewpoint, however, each legislature should have the power
to tax any instrumentality which derives a benefit, protection, or
privilege from that state' 2 and, because the Constitution does not
explicitly deny the right of the state to tax such instrumentalities,' 3
the rejection of that right would have serious state-federal sovereignty
implications.
The California court in Scandinavian was forced to balance these
issues and chose to do so in favor of the federal preemption. Whether
this was the proper course is the subject of this article.
II. COMMERCE AND DUE PROCESS CLAUSES
A discussion of the power of a state to levy a tax on instrumentalities
engaged in interstate commerce must necessarily involve a discussion of
both the due process and commerce clauses of the Constitution. The
distinction between the two concepts as they affect the state's power to
tax is not entirely clear because discussion of one in turn involves a
discussion of the other; however, an attempt will be made to delineate
each concept as it affects the topics of this paper.' 4
A. DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
The due process clause' ' affects a state's inherent power to tax, i.e.,
the actual authority of a state to tax is limited to its geographical
territory and any concomitant power it may have over its citizens
whether within or without the territory.' 6 Therefore, under the
12. In Braniff the majority relied on the "benefit and protection" test as a basis for upholding
the state's jurisdiction to tax. "When we speak of the jurisdiction to tax ... we mean
no more than the benefit and protection of laws enabling the owner to enjoy the fruits of
his ownership and the power to reach effectively the interests protected.... " Braniff
Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd., 347 U.S. 590, 600 (1954).
13. Most, if not all, of the foreign flag airlines are owned outright or controlled by the coun-
tries in which they are based. Thus, it is not only a question of the power of a state to
tax foreign domiciliaries, but the power to tax an international sovereign entity.
14. See notes 7 and 10 supra. See also Comment, supra note 8, at 520, which points out that
the language in Braniff supports a due process concept as well as commerce concepts.
15. The "home-port" doctrine and the apportionment-of-tax principle, although having due
process connections, will be considered in conjunction with the commerce clause. Early
decisions dealing with the "home-port" doctrine appear to be based on the commerce
clause, see Hays v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 58 U.S. (17 How.) 596 (1854); but subse-
quent decisions base the doctrine on the due process clause. Still later opinions dealing
with the "home-port" doctrine talk in terms of both the commerce clause and the due
process clause. See Comment, supra note 7, at 520. Because Hays was decided before the
enactment of the fourteenth amendment, it is a dubious notion that the "home-port"
doctrine was originally based on the due process clause. Although it likewise cannot
necessarily be said that the Hays line of cases grew out of considerations expressed in
Cooley, as seemed to be intimidated by the California Court in Scandinavian (see Com-
ment, supra note 3, at 96-98), the "home-port" doctrine is definitely related to the com-
merce clause principles of undue discrimination, multiple burden, and regulation of com-
merce between the states and foreign nations.
16. See Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954); 51 CORNELL L.Q. 346, 347 (1966).
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fourteenth amendment, a state or division thereof cannot tax persons,
property or events outside its sphere of influence.' 7 In order to be
taxed, an instrumentality must have a "situs" within the state. Situs is
the actual tangible and/or intangible being within the jurisdiction.
Under present concepts, an instrumentality has situs within a state
when the state has a certain minimum contact or "nexus"' 8 with the
instrumentality. A tax on something having no situs within the taxing
state, i.e., over which the state has no "nexus", 1 9 would constitute a
denial of due process under the fourteenth amendment.2"
Braniff should dispose of the contention that a foreign flag air carrier
would be denied due process if the aircraft was, in fact, physically
present in the jurisdiction at the time of the levy.2' In Braniff, the
Court apparently based its decision on a due process concept alone,
2 
2
17. See Page, Jurisdiction to Tax Chattels, 1945 Wisc. L. REv. 125, 126 n.2. See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 1, 2, 3 (1965).
18. For cases discussing, "nexus", see, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377
U.S. 436 (1964); Central R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607 (1961); Scripto, Inc. v. Car-
son, 362 U.S. 207 (1960); Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954); Braniff Airways,
Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd., 347 U.S. 590 (1954); Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue,
340 U.S. 534 (1951). Seeg enerally 51 CORNELL L. Q. 346, 347 (1966).
19. What constitutes "nexus" is still, for the most part, unanswered. For a congressional
attempt to answer questions of nexus in the field of state taxation of income, see 15
U.S.C. § 381 (1970).
However, it is certain that at least: (1) the taxable incident must take place within
the taxing jurisdiction, see 51 CORNELL L. Q., 346, 347 (1966); (2) the contacts of the juris-
diction must be systematic and regular, Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960); cf.
Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd., 347 U.S. 590 (1954). But cf. Central R.R. v.
Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607 (1961); ond (3) the business enjoying the taxable incident
must be benefited by its use of the jurisdiction's facilities. "So far as due process is con-
cerned the only question is whether the tax in practical operation has relation to op-
portunities, benefits or protection conferred or afforded by the taxing State." Ott v.
Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 366 U.S. 169, 174 (1949). For a good discussion of the
quid pro quo theory, see generally, Symposium, Developments-State Taxation, 75
HARV. L. REV. 983 (1962).
20. Since the enactment of the fourteenth amendment the due process rights found in the
fifth amendment are applicable to the states. As enlarged by the equal protection
clause, the principle would also demand that there be some degree of reasonableness
between the tax and the object to be taxed, Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd.,
347 U.S. 590 (1954); Phillips Chemical Co. v. Dumas Independent School Dist., 361 U.S.
376 (1960), and some degree of uniformity in tax rates and assessment. See Barnes,
Taxation of Inter-State Commerce, 16 WES. RES. L. REV. 859, 861 (1965).
21. See Comment, supra note 3, at 93. This would assume arguendo that an alien could
claim the protection of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Arguments
by at least two legal writings based on Burnett v. Brooks, 288 U.S. 378 (1933) (fifth
amendment did not prohibit federal government from levying estate tax on non-resi-
dent alien) deny that such a protection exists. See Comment, 23 CALIF. L. REV. 93, 100
(1934); Note, 47 HARV. L. REV. 307, 314 (1933).
22. In relying upon the Commerce Clause on this issue (that the aircraft never at-
tained a taxable situs in the state) and in not specifically claiming protection under
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, appellant names the wrong
Constitutional Clause to support its position.... [T]he bare question whether
an instrumentality of commerce has tax situs in a state for the purpose of subjec-
tion to a property tax is one of due process.
Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd., 347 U.S. 590, 598-99 (1954). But see
Justice Frankfurter's dissent for a criticism of the majority resting its decision solely on
due process grounds. Id. at 603-09.
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while upholding an apportioned ad valorem property tax levied by
Nebraska on Braniff's aircraft which were not domiciled in Nebraska.
The Court applied the "benefits, protection, and opportunities" test,
and ruled in favor of the tax despite any multiple-burden arguments
raised by the taxpayer.2 3
Thus, if state taxation of foreign flag air carriers involved only due
process considerations, the question of the power to levy apparently
would be answered in favor of the state; surely foreign flag aircraft
would have as much contact with the state as the interstate aircraft had
in Braniff. However, because the commerce clause problems raised by
state taxation of aircraft were left unanswered by Braniff, much
speculation remains as to this area of controversy. The California
Supreme Court in Scandinavian relied on the commerce clause to
invalidate the tax in question, thereby answering, for California at least,
some of the commerce clause problems. Because the United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari in Scandihavian, the commerce clause
concepts need further examination.
B. COMMERCE CLAUSE
Under the Constitution, only Congress has the power to regulate
interstate and foreign commerce.2 4 However, power to tax is
concurrent,2" and a state can, under certain circumstances, tax
businesses engaged in interstate and foreign commerce even though it,
in a sense, thereby "regulates" interstate and foreign commerce.
Because Congress has been reluctant to enter the arena, the state's
power to tax is limited only by the negative implication in the
commerce clause and by due process standards as interpreted by the
Supreme Court.
Questions left unanswered by McCulloch v. Maryland2 6 and
compounded by Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia
2
have perplexed legal scholars and haunted the Supreme Court ever since
their decisions. McCulloch, of course, stands for the proposition that
the commerce clause is a self-executing restraint on the state's power to
interfere with interstate or foreign commerce and its incidents.
2 
1
Cooley adds the proposition that the commerce clause does not
prohibit a state from regulating commerce except in those fields
23. Id. at 609.
24. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 427 (1819). But see, Crew Levick Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 245 U.S. 292, 297 (1917) for dicta implying that a property tax would not
constitute a regulation of commerce.
25. This power is reserved to the states through the "police power" of the tenth amendment.
26. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
27. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
28. See Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12
How.) 299, 318-19 (1851); The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 446-47 (1844);
Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 448-49 (1827).
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preempted by or those fields admitting of "one uniform system".9
Thus, the McCulloch-Cooley doctrine takes essentially a middle-of-the-
road position between absolute federal power and some state power."0
From this approach flows many questions: 3' Is a state interfering with
interstate and foreign commerce by taxing it in order to receive
income? How much of a tax can a state impose without it being a
restraint? What constitutes an undue or discriminatory burden?
The earliest Supreme Court cases attempting to answer the question
of state taxation of instrumentalities engaged in interstate and foreign
commerce involved vessels plying the high seas; and this led to the
development of the "home-port" doctrine.
As first enunciated in Hays v. Pacific Mail Streamship Co.,3 2 the
"home-port" doctrine allowed full taxation by the domiciliary state of
ocean-going vessels. 3 ' This doctrine was extended in 1871 to include
vessels engaged in interstate commerce exclusively plying inland
waters;3" however, this extension was overruled in 1949." A further
restriction of the doctrine came in Pullman's Palace Car Co. v.
Pennsylvania,3 6 which distinguished railroad rolling stock from ocean
going vessels when the Supreme Court held that because of its
transitory nature, rolling stock had no fixed situs and therefore must
be, for the purpose of taxation, treated differently from vessels which
29. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851). See generally Bikl6,
The Silence of Congress, 41 HARV. L. REV. 200 (1927).
30. The Supreme Court could have decided that only Congress has the power to regulate
commerce; the states then would not have been able to tax commerce at all and Con-
gress would have been forced to enact rules to prevent discrimination against interstate
and foreign commerce. On the other hand, the Supreme Court could have decided that
the power was concurrent so that Congress would have been compelled to permit
taxation sufficient to make commerce pay its way by removing any constitutional dis-
crimination in favor of interstate or foreign commerce. Not having the ability to see the
many changes and improvements in transportation and communication at the time of
laying the groundwork for the interpretations of the commerce clause, the Court has
repeatedly decided cases upon a principle that no longer can be rationally supported or
maintained. Something must be done to change the law to fit modern needs. The answer
is Congressional action.
31. See Barnes, supra note 20, at 865.
32. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 596 (1854).
33. The Court in Hays was not clear as to what constituted the "home-port" of the vessel
for taxation purposes - the port of registry, the port of origination, or the port of owner-
ship. The Court clarified matters in St. Louis v. Ferry Co., 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 423 (1871)
which held that the home port of a vessel is the entry port of the nearest residence of
the owner and not the port of registry. A still later decision provided an exception to the
exclusive situs home-port rule and allowed full taxation by a state in which the vessel
had acquired a permanent situs. See Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. Virginia, 198 U.S.
299 (1905).
34. St. Louis v. Ferry Co., 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 423 (1871).
35. Because it was clear that application of the "home-port" doctrine would deny a non-
domiciliary state any taxes in return for benefits supplied, St. Louis was overruled by
Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169 (1949). Ott involved barges and
tugs operating along the Mississippi River and domiciled in Ohio. Louisana levied an
apportioned tax on these barges which made regular stops in Louisiana, and the Court,
applying the opportunities-and-benefits doctrine, upheld the tax.
36. 141 U.S. 18 (1891).
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travel international waterways, have a home port, and touch land only
incidentally.3 The Court explained that because the two operations
were so dissimilar in reference to the countervailing state-federal
constitutional duties and powers, the "home-port" doctrine should not
be applied.3 8 Pullman led to the formulation of the apportionment-of-
taxation doctrine,3" whereby a taxing jurisdiction can only tax an
instrumentality moving in interstate commerce on a basis apportioned
by an accepted formula to the actual presence of the instrumentality in
the jurisdiction.4" This apportionment doctrine partially relieved any
multiple taxation burden caused by each jurisdiction levying on the full
value of the instrumentality.4
The Supreme Court has also abandoned the "home-port" doctrine in
37. Id. at 23.
38. The Court in Pullman intimated that the basis for the failure of the Court to reverse the
Hays line of cases as it applied to vessels was that vessels travelling the high seas, as
opposed to railroad rolling stock, are instruments of communication with other nations
and are thus assured to be federally regulated, "[aInd that since vehicles of commerce
by water are instrumentalities of communication with other nations, the regulation of
them is assured by the National Legislature." Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania,
141 U.S. 18, 23-24 (1891). But see Canadian Pacific Ry. v. King County, 90 Wash. 38,
155 P. 416 (1916), in which the Washington Supreme Court upheld an apportioned tax
levied on railroad cars owned by a Canadian corporation. The Washington court, apply-
ing the general rule that taxable property is subject to taxation in the state in which it is
located, felt that there was nothing in the Constitution which prevented a state from
taxing tangible property engaged in foreign commerce. "It is equally well settled that
there is nothing in the Constitution or laws of the United States which prevents a state
from taxing personal property employed in interstate or foreign commerce like other
personal property." Id. at 43, 155 P. at 418.
39. See, e.g., Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905); Union Re-
frigerator Transit Co. v. Lynch, 177 U.S. 149 (1900); American Refrigerator Transit
Co. v. Hall, 174 U.S. 70 (1899).
40. Although the Supreme Court has never put its stamp of approval on the use of any spe-
cific formula, earlier decisions seemed to uphold any formula used to apportion which
was reasonably related to the use of property in the state or the benefits derived from
its use in the state. See Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194
(1905). Later decisions seemed to base the validity of the formulae on a time-use factor.
See Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd., 347 U.S. 590 (1954); Southern Pacific
Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U.S. 63 (1911). Present formulae used by states for interstate allo-
cation of aircraft include: (1) those which allocate value only to states in which landings
and take-offs are made; (2) those which allocate solely on the basis of route miles or
plane miles, inclusive of overflight miles. ATA Brief at 4-5. The formula used by Ne-
braska which was approved in Braniff allocates all value to states with clearly estab-
lished taxing jurisdictions; whereas California uses a formula which segregates an air
carriers' fleet by types of plane and allocates the value of each group in the fleet in the
proportion that the total plane time in California bears to total plane time both within
and without the state. ATA Brief at 6.
41. Ideally the apportionment doctrine would relieve any chance of taxing the property on
more than its full value. See Scandinavian Airlines System, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles,
56 Cal. 2d 11, 363 P.2d 25, 14 Cal. Rptr. 25 (1961). The Supreme Court has stated
that "... the rule which permits taxation by two or more states on an apportioned basis
precluded taxation of all property by the state of domicile." Standard Oil Co. v. Peck,
342 U.S. 382 (1952). But cf. Central R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607 (1962), which
upheld an unapportioned tax levied on railroad rolling stock by the domicile state even
when it was shown that other states could have gained jurisdiction to tax the rolling
stock on an apportioned basis but had not done so.
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favor of the apportionment doctrine in regard to motor carriers,4 2 and
aircraft,4  although in Central R.R. v. Pennsylvania4 4 the Court upheld
an unapportioned tax levied by the domicile on railroad rolling stock
even though the taxpayer showed that some fraction of the property
was absent from the state for part of the tax year.45
The status of the "home-port" doctrine is best determined by
reference to Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. 4 6 which first
applied the apportionment doctrine to inland water vessels while
pointing out that the "home-port" doctrine is still applicable to
ocean-going vessels.4 1 This contradiction would seem to indicate that
the basis for the original application of the "home-port" doctrine was
not to establish a limitation on the state's power to tax interstate
commerce, but primarily to establish a limitation on the state's power
to tax .an instrumentality (ocean-going vessel) imbued with interna-
tional flavor and associated with foreign commerce, thus admitting of
"one uniform system". Analysis of Scandinavian indicates that the
California Supreme Court rested its decision to follow the "home-port"
doctrine on this interpretation of Ott (and consequently Hays) when it
invalidated the California tax on foreign flag air carriers.45
42. See, e.g., Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542 (1950); Areo Mayflower Tran-
sit Co. v. Board of Railroad Comm'rs, 332 U.S. 495 (1947); Hendrick v. Maryland, 235
U.S. 610 (1915).
43. At first instance, the Court seemed to apply the "home-port" doctrine. See Northwest
Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944). The Court in Braniff implicitly reversed
Northwest and applied the apportionment doctrine.
44. 370 U.S. 607 (1962).
45. Analysis of Central indicates that the case turned on a burden of proof point rather than
the "home-port" doctrine:
In short... this record shows only that a determinable number of appellant's
cars were employed outside the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania during the rele-
vant tax year. But as this leaves at large the possibility of their having a nondomi-
ciliary tax situs elsewhere, that showing does not suffice under our cases to ex-
clude Pennsylvania from taxing such cars to their full value.... Accordingly we con-
clude that ... appellant has failed to sustain its burden of proving that a tax situs
has been acquired elsewhere.
Id. at 616, 618. But the holding did rely on cases which utilized "home-port" language,
establishing that the home port had the power to tax the full value of the property ex-
cept where the property acquired an actual situs elsewhere. In Central, the taxpayer
simply failed to prove that the property acquired an actual situs elsewhere.
Central relied on New York Central R.R. v. Miller, 202 U.S. 584 (1906) which held
that the taxpayer could not escape imposition of its domicile's property tax on the full
value of its assets merely by showing that some determinable fraction of the property
was absent from the state during part of the new year. New York Central, in turn, im-
plicitly rested on Old Dominion S.S. Co. v. Virginia, 198 U.S. 299 (1905) (a vessel case)
which modified the strict "home-port" rule.
46. 336 U.S. 169 (1949).
47. "We do not reach the question of taxability of ocean carriage but confine our decision to
transportation on inland waters." Id. at 173-74.
48. In other words, the court [Ott] held (without specifically stating) that an instrumentality
of commerce which leaves the nation's shores becomes so peculiarly imbued with inter-
national characteristics that it would be unwise to allow any state but that of domicile to
exercise sovereignty beyond that necessary under ordinary police powers.
56 Cal. 2d at 25, 363 P.2d at 33, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
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A question that remains to be answered by the United States
Supreme Court is whether or not a state's power to tax or regulate
instrumentalities engaged solely in foreign commerce is greater or lesser
than its power with respect to interstate commerce. Although the
commerce clause contains no apparent distinction between regulation
of interstate and foreign commerce,4 9 there is an argument in favor of
the proposition that the negative implications of Congress' power over
foreign commerce is broader than that over interstate commerce. 0
Although there is nothing definite in the records of the Constitutional
Convention regarding the broader aspects of the foreign commerce
provision other than an expressed concern for regulation of foreign
commerce, contemporary writings and debates indicate the superior
position of the foreign commerce provision as opposed to the negative
and supplemental position afforded the interstate commerce provi-
sion.' 1 Although the Supreme Court has yet to rule, there are dicta and
concurring opinions in several cases suggesting that the foreign
commerce prohibition is broader than the interstate commerce
prohibition." 2
49. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. "The Congress shall have Power ... to regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States .... "
50. But cf. Comment, supra note 3, at 101. ("Although there is some evidence that the Con-
stitutional grant of power to the federal government was intended to be greater with
respect to foreign commerce than with respect to interstate commerce, the juxtaposi-
tion of the two provisions in the Commerce Clause argues for their equation.").
51. See Comment, supra note 7, at 521-22 n.29 for sample quotes, citations, and comments.
Indeed there is support for this proposition in the Constitution: "No State shall...
lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports... [and] no state shall.., lay any
Duty of Tonnage...." U. S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
52. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 228-29 (1824) in which Justice Johnson,
concurring, stated:
Power to regulate foreign commerce, is given... in the same breath... with
that over the commerce of the states... But the power to regulate foreign com-
merce is necessarily exclusive. The States are unknown to foreign nations; their
sovereignty exists only with relation to each other and the general government...
[All other regulations, but those which Congress had imposed, would be re-
garded by foreign nations as trespasses and violations of national faith and comity.
and Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 434 (1932), in
which the Court stated:
And, again in the Constitution, the power to regulate commerce is conferred
by the same words of the commerce clause with respect to both foreign commerce
and interstate commerce. Yet the power when exercised in respect of foreign com-
merce may be broader than when exercised as to interstate commerce.
See also Board of Trustees v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 59 (1933) (dictum); Buttfield v.
Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 492 (1904) (dictum); Bowman v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 125 U.S.
465, 482-83 (1888) (dictum).
A contrary conclusion may be read in the dictum of Justice Marshall in Brown v.
Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 449 (1827):
It may be proper to add, that we suppose the principles laid down in this
case, [affecting the commerce clause and the import-export clause] to apply
equally to impositions from a sister state. We do not mean to give any opinion on
a tax discriminating between foreign and domestic articles.
Although the doctrine as to the import-export clause has been repudiated by subsequent
decisions, see Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945), the Court has yet to
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Because foreign commerce is clearly a matter of national concern,
the coupling of the McCulloch-Cooley doctrine with this arguably
broader foreign commerce prohibition would necessarily render nil the
state's power to regulate in the foreign commerce area. And even
though Congress has not legislated in this direction, the federal
government has, by implication, plenary rights in the area.
5 "
Assuming, arguendo, that a state's power to tax is a positive
concurrent power granted in the Constitution apart from the negative
power derived through the commerce clause," ' the negative implication
of the more pervasive foreign commerce prohibition coupled with the
McCulloch-Cooley doctrine must be deemed to override a state's
concurrent power to tax even on a quid pro quo apportioned basis.
5"
When the carrier has a foreign domicile,5 6 the multiple taxation
implications could be dangerous because the Supreme Court obviously
has no power to control taxation by foreign countries.
5 ' Even if the
domestic tax is apportioned, the danger still exists inasmuch as a
foreign country could tax the aircraft at full value. Multiple taxation
would cause undue burdens and discrimination of air carriers, whether
domestic or foreign, flying solely international routes.5 8
specifically reject Marshall's dictum pertaining to the commerce clause. Some state
courts have drawn on Marshall's language in Brown to speak of the equality of the two
commerce clause powers. See, e.g., Steinbach v. Genova, 4 N.Y.2d 302, 151 N.E.2d
170, 175 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1958) (dictum); Bush v. State Tax. Comm'r, 65 Wash. 2d 895, 400
P.2d 315 (1965).
53. If these rights are not derived from the commerce clause, then they are at least derived
from the import-export clause, the executive powers, etc.
54. See note 25 supra.
55. See Scandinavian Airlines System, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 56 Cal. 2d 11.363
P.2d 25, 32, 14 Cal. Rptr. 25, 32 (1961). But see, Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245
U.S. 292, 297 (1917), for dicta implying that such a property tax would not constitute a
regulation of commerce.
56. This is true even when the carrier is a domestic domiciliary but flies only international
flights. See, e.g., Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 51 Cal. 2d 314, 333
P.2d 323 (1958).
57. Conceivably a foreign country would have the power to tax aircraft at the full value even
if the aircraft was of domestic origin. If a tax such as the apportioned one upheld in
Flying Tiger was imposed on every aircraft flying in foreign commerce, it could create a
multiple burden on that air company since every foreign country into which it flew could
impose a tax at its full value. Only a sense of comity would protect these air companies
from discrimination since the Supreme Court could not serve as a common arbiter as it
has in the interstate taxation cases. Although it is doubtful that each foreign country
would impose such a tax, it could in reciprocity to a state imposing even apportioned
taxes on its flag carriers. See Comment, supra note 7.
58. Reports submitted by the Attorney General, the Civil Aeronautics Board, and the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee have informed Congress of the danger of multiple taxation
and direct regulation of international air carriers. The reports recommend the use of
treaties to remedy the problem. See MULTIPLE TAXATION OF AIR COMMERCE, H.R. Doc.
No. 141, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945); INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT POLICY, H.R.
Doc. No. 142, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945); SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 76TH
CONG., 1ST SESS., EXEC. REPORT No. 18 (1939).
The California Supreme Court in Scandinavian partly based its decision on multiple
tax treaties and executive agreements enacted with Sweden, Denmark, and Norway.
See Income Tax Treaty with Sweden, March 23, 1939, 54 Stat. 1759, 1760-61 (1939-
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The California court in Scandinavian, although overtly basing its
decision on the "home-port" doctrine, by implication, appeared to have
the broader foreign commerce prohibition and the multiple tax danger
in mind when deciding the case." 9 The court's apparent purpose in
distinguishing Braniff by choosing to follow the previously restricted
"home-port" doctrine was to resolve a problem having international
implications, while at the same time refraining from going out on a
constitutional limb by answering sticky constitutional questions which
the United States Supreme Court and Congress have not yet attempted
to answer.
III. IMPORT-EXPORT AND DUTY OF TONNAGE CLAUSES
Other clauses in the Constitution which support the stronger federal
power position include the Import-Export and Duty of Tonnage
clauses. Under the Constitution no state, without consent of Congress,
may lay "any imposts or duties on Imports or Exports" or "any duty
of tonnage. '"6 0
One of the primary purposes of the import-export clause and the
commerce clause was to prevent the practice which flourished during
the Confederation period whereby a state in an advantageous position
exacted "tolls" on goods, including foreign goods, which had to pass
through that state in order to reach their destination. The duty-of-
tonnage clause was added to supplement the import-export clause so
that the purpose of the clause would not be defeated by the effect of
taxes levied on their transportation. 6'
Although aircraft flying in commerce are not exports or imports, a
tax levied upon aircraft can be said to be closely related to the
imported or exported cargo so as to fall within the constitutional
prohibition.6 2 It can be argued that the import-export clause, although
literally not applying to ad valorem property taxes, might still be
extended to prohibit state taxation of foreign owned air carriers if
41), T.S. No. 958; Convention with Norway, June 13, 1949, [19511 2 U.S.T. 2323,
T.I.A.S. No. 2357; Convention with Denmark, May 6, 1948, 62 Stat. 1730 (1948),
T.I.A.S. No. 1854.
There is some question whether these treaties truly encompassed ad valorem prop-
erty taxes on aircraft. The Swedish treaty, if it does encompass ad valorem property
taxes, does so only on a non-reciprocal basis. See Comment, supra note 7, at 536.
59. 56 Cal. 2d at 33, 363 P.2d at 38, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
In our opinion the basic reasoning behind the controlling principles is that any
instrumentality which engages in commerce between two or more sovereign na-
tions must have but one taxable situs. Common sense requires that such situs be
the port where the instrumentality is in good faith domiciled.
60. U.S. CONST. art I, § 10.
61. See Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945); Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama,
296 U.S. 261, 264-65 (1935).
62. See Comment, supra note 7, at 531.
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international air transportation could be deemed an activity "clearly
and directly related" to the process of exporting and importing.
6
3
Likewise, ad valorem property taxes would not literally fall within
the province of the tonnage clause because that clause would only
apply to duties measured by the capacity of the vessel. However,
because the clause has been interpreted in a manner broader than its
literal meaning,6 4 it is conceivable that a state could levy an ad
valorem personal property tax based on passenger-miles, a formula
intimately related to the capacity of the aircraft. Although a property
tax levied on a vessel owned by a citizen of a state and based upon the
valuation of the vessel as property (which could be levied on the basis
of capacity and therefore tonnage) is not invalidated by the tonnage
clause, 65  an argument could be made for the proposition that an
apportioned property tax levied on a foreign owned vessel would fall
within the prohibition of the clause.6 6
IV. INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
The effect of international law on the question of taxation of air
carriers in foreign commerce is even less clear than the constitutional
implications. There seems to be no international common law principle
to the effect that a state must apportion taxes levied on foreign
instrumentalities.6  A country could conceivably tax anything in its
jurisdiction in any manner not violative of its organic law. Thus, if there
is any international prohibition on a country's right to tax, it must be
by treaty.
The majority of the California Supreme Court in Scandinavian relied
on treaties 6 8 between the United States and the Scandinavian countries
making up the consortium airline. These treaties encompass provisions
covering duplication of taxation by the signatory powers or political
subdivisions thereof.6 9 Although these treaties are not congressional
63. Though this extension is stretching the meaning of the clause a great deal, Justice Doug-
las' concurrence in Joseph v. Carter & Weeks Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1947),
basing an overturning of a tax levied on gross receipts of a stevedoring company on the
import-export clause, suggests that it is not untenable. Under the "clearly and directly
related" concept, the Supreme Court has invalidated such taxes as a fixed license tax
on importers; Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827); and a stamp tax on
foreign bills of lading, Almy v. California, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 169 (1860).
64. See Comment, supra note 7, at 531.
65. See Gunther v. Mayor & City Council, 55 Md. 457 (1880), People ex. rel. Pacific Mail
S.S. Co. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 58 N.Y. 242 (1874); cf. Transportation Co. v. Wheel-
ing, 99 U.S. 273, 283 (1878) (interstate commerce only).
66. See Comment, supra note 7, at 532.
67. Metzger, Lecture on the Effects of Articles Dealing with Taxation in the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade, for a course in International Trade Regulations, George-
town Law School, Fall Term, 1967.
68. The word "treaties" for the sake of simplification is used to refer to either treaties,
protocols or executive agreements.
69. See Comment, supra note 7, at 531.
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action as contemplated by the commerce clause, they are binding upon
the states as the supreme law of the land,7 0 and any tax repugnant to
the agreements would be invalid.
The Scandinavian court liberally interpreted the agreements to
encompass the prohibition of taxation of personal property. Although
they would seem to cover shipping and air traffic, it is not entirely clear
what types of taxes they would encompass. 7 ' The California court
reasoned that the Swedish agreement encompassed ad valorem property
taxes since: (1) nothing in the Swedish agreement negated or limited its
coverage; (2) there is broad language in the agreement as to the types of
taxes encompassed; and (3) there is language in the agreement
indicating specific references to property and profit taxes to be levied
on air transport facilities.7 2 As to the agreements with Norway and
Denmark, the court felt that although the agreements contained no
specific ban on property taxes, they did so by implication. 73 These
agreements do talk in terms of taxable situs 74 and imposition of
burdensome taxes, and thus, it is feasible that they do resolve the
very problems raised by this paper.
On the other hand it can be said that these agreements do not
encompass ad valorem personal property taxes imposed by states.
Article I of the Swedish agreement excluded local property taxation in
the United States from the province of the agreement and makes it
clear that the United States did not wish to make an agreement
respecting any state or local taxes.7 6 As pointed out by Justice Traynor
in his dissent in Scandinavian, such vital things as failure to mention
specifically personal property taxes in both the Norwegian and Danish
agreements, and failure to restrict specifically the taxing power of the
states and their subdivisions in the Swedish agreement would not have
been left to implication and supposition.7  If each country truly has
absolute power to tax that over which it has jurisdiction under
international law, then restrictions placed on that power should be
specifically included in such an agreement. 7 8
70. See Scandinavian Airlines System, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 56 Cal. 2d 11, 37-40,
47-48, 363 P.2d 25, 41-42, 47, 14 Cal. Rptr. 25, 41-42, 47 (1961).
71. Id. at 38, 363 P.2d at 41, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 41.
72. Id. at 38-40, 353 P.2d at 41-42, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 41-42.
73. Id. at 39, 363 P.2d at 42, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 42. But see Traynor's dissent in Scandinavian.
"A matter so vital as restrictions on the taxing power of the states and their subdivisions
would hardly have been left to implication from the provisions of Article XIII, which are
directly referable to Swedish property taxes and the United States capital stock tax."
Id. at 48, 363 P.2d at 47, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 47.
74. Treaty with Sweden, supra note 58, at 1760, 1761, 1766, art. IV.
75. Id., Preamble.
76. Scandinavian Airlines System, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 56 Cal. 2d 11, 48, 363 P.2d
25, 47, 14 Cal. Rptr. 25, 47 (1961).
77. Id.
78. For a good discussion on the interpretation of treaties see generally Law of Treaties, 29
AM. J. INT'L L. 937 (Supp. 1935).
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What may be learned from these agreements and later agreements
(such as the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade7" and the Treaty
of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between the United States
and Japan)8 0 is that there is concern over problems of taxation among
countries having foreign investments and engaging in international trade
and transportation.' ' Although the taxation provisions in GATT and
the Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty do not seem to focus
on problems of multiple personal property taxation, it is certain that
the United States in joining with the signatory powers in these
agreements recognizes the need for the protection of the parties from
discriminatory taxation. Since these agreements have been approved by
the Senate, they do bear some congressional sanction of federal
participation in the area and thus suggest the proposition that the field
has been federally preempted. No one individual state should be
allowed, without some congressional sanction, to create problems
involving foreign trade and foreign relations by establishing a system of
taxation discriminatory by its very nature.
V. CONCLUSION
Whether a state can properly levy a property tax on a foreign flag air
carrier engaged solely in foreign commerce remains unanswered, and
extremely thorny constitutional and international issues permeate the
area. To date, neither the United States Supreme Court nor Congress
has attempted to answer the question.' 2 Scandinavian, which is the
latest word to be rendered by any court, indicates that a state cannot
levy even an apportioned personal property tax on foreign carriers
engaged in foreign commerce.8 3 Is this the last word or is it just a
restatement of doctrine never thought to be questioned? If it is true, as
stated in Scandinavian, that it has been assumed for the last 185 years
that property owned and based in a foreign country engaged solely in
foreign trade is nontaxable, then it truly makes no difference whether
79. The General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade was not signed as a separate document but
was attached to the Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employ-
ment, October 30, 1947. See T.I.A.S. No. 1700 for text.
80. April 2, 1953, [19531 2 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863.
81. See id. Art. XI.
82. The Supreme Court has held in Braniff that a state other than the domicile can levy per-
sonal property taxes on air carriers if it apportions its levy; however, the holding is of
little precedental value since the case pertained to domestic carriers flying only in inter-
state commerce. Although it cannot be said that the framers of the Constitution could
have fathomed the complexities of modern business, transportation, and communication,
as well as the problem of gathering revenue to finance state and local governments, the
Court has not hesitated to interpret the Constitution most befitting the economic and
social needs in this century. Surely the Court recognizes the problem, yet it refuses to
do anything determinatively about it. Thus, Congress should enter this area.
83. Scandinavian Airlines System, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 56 Cal. 2d 11, 363 P.2d 25,
14 Cal. Rptr. 25 (1961).
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the doctrine stemmed from constitutional prohibition or from
policy.' 
Why then did taxing authorities in California attempt the very thing
assumed to be impossible? The answer is clear, to raise more revenue.
This penchant need for revenue will not diminish; and because there is
no definitive statement by an authority higher than the California
Supreme Court, other jurisdictions may try to make such a levy in
return for the benefits, opportunities and protection afforded by the
State.8 5
As long as the question remains unanswered, the problem it creates
prevails.8 6 Although no attempt has been made by any state to levy a
property tax on foreign carriers since the decision in Scandinavian, the
continued concern among international air carriers' 7 and the executive
concern over the problem of multiple taxation indicate the need for a
definitive answer either by the United States Supreme Court, or
preferably by Congress.8 8
84. Id. at 42, 363 P.2d at 44, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
85. There are at least 30 states which make some assessment of commercial aircraft for ad
valorem property taxes. See note 8 supra. If these states chose to do so, why could they
not levy on foreign carriers engaged in foreign commerce?
86. Although Scandinavian answered the question of whether a state can tax a foreign flag
carrier engaged in foreign commerce in the negative, the case did not answer the ques-
tions of whether a state can tax (1) a domestic, non-domiciled air carrier engaged solely
in foreign commerce, but having terminal facilities in the taxing state; (2) a domestic air
carrier flying only international routes, but domiciled in the taxing state (since the pres-
ent status of Flying Tiger is unclear); (3) a foreign flag carrier flying routes which cause
it to touch down in more than one state; and (4) a foreign flag carrier having equipment
which has acquired a permanent situs in the United States.
87. See note 11 supra.
88. Cf. Evansville-Vanderburgh A.A. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 404 U.S. 819 (1972), in
which a "service charge" of one dollar levied by Evansville, Indiana and the State of
New Hampshire on persons enplaning American owned and based commercial airliners
engaged in domestic and interstate flight was held constitutional. The question of such
a charge on persons using airliners engaged solely in foreign commerce was not discussed.
For Congressional reaction calling for a moratorium on such charges, see H.R. 14847,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
For a case in which the Supreme Court may answer some of the questions presented
by this article, see also United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, 49 11. 2d 45, 273 N.E.2d 585
(1971), prob. juris. noted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3455 (U.S. Mar. 20, 1972), argued, 41 U.S.L.W.
3271 (U.S. Nov. 8, 1972), which held that imposition of a use tax on aviation fuel loaded
at a Chicago airport on planes in interstate and foreign flight does not offend the com-
merce clause.
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